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Beneath the Tip of The Iceberg: A Human Factors Analysis of General
Aviation Accidents in Alaska Versus the Rest of the United States

INTRODUCTION

seen in Figure 1, when taking into account the size of
the state, it is no wonder that air travel is a must. In fact,
some parts of Alaska are only accessible by air.

Considerable effort has been expended over the last
several decades to improve safety in both military and
commercial aviation. Even though many people have
died and millions of dollars in assets have been lost, the
numbers pale in comparison to those suffered every year
within general aviation (GA). For example, according to
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), there
were 1,741 GA accidents in 2003 that resulted in 629
fatalities (NTSB, 2005). While the numbers may not
register with some, when considered within the context
of commercial aviation, the losses suffered annually by
GA are roughly equivalent to the complete loss of three
commercial passenger Boeing 727s.
Why, then, has GA historically received less attention?
Perhaps it is because flying has become relatively common
as literally millions of travelers board commercial aircraft
daily. Not surprising then, when a commercial airliner
crashes, it instantly becomes headline news, shaking the
confidence of the flying public.
In contrast, GA accidents happen virtually every day,
yet they receive little attention and seldom appear on
the front page of USA Today. Perhaps this is because
they happen in isolated places, involving only a couple
of unfortunate souls at a time. In fact, unless the plane
crashed into a school, church, or some other public venue,
it is unlikely that anyone outside the local media, government, or those intimately involved with the accident
even knew it happened.
Over the last couple of years, general aviation has
deservedly received increasing attention from the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA Flight Plan 2004-2008)
and other safety professionals. Indeed, several groups
from the government (e.g., the FAA’s Civil Aerospace
Medical Institute, National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health), private sector (e.g., the Medallion
Foundation), and universities (e.g., University of Illinois,
Johns Hopkins University) have conducted a number of
studies examining GA accident causation.

Figure 1. Relative size of Alaska to the
continental United States. (Taken from a
briefing from the FAA Alaska Region.)

Alaska is known for its varied and often unique landscape, including but not limited to, seemingly endless
mountain ranges, glaciers, lakes, long coastlines, volcanoes, and fjords. When this veritable obstacle course
is considered, along with temperamental weather and
seasonal lighting conditions, even the most experienced
pilot would have to agree that Alaskan aviation represents
some of the most difficult flying in the U.S., if not the
world. The combination of factors mentioned above, the
number of GA accidents that are occurring in Alaska,
and the FAA’s accident reduction goal (FAA Flight Plan
2004-2008) were factors in our decision to implement
this study.
Human Error and General Aviation
A variety of studies have been conducted in an attempt
to understand the causes of GA accidents. Most have
focused on contextual factors or pilot demographics,
rather than the underlying causes of the accidents. Past
research has shown factors like weather [e.g., Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) versus Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)], lighting (e.g., day versus
night), and terrain (e.g., mountainous versus featureless)
play a part in these accidents; however, pilots have little
control over them. Other studies have found that a pilot’s
gender, age, occupation, or flight experience contribute
to the accidents (Baker, Lamb, Grabowski, Rebok, &
Li, 2001; Li, Baker, Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001; Urban,

Alaskan Aviation
It is of note that many of these efforts have focused on
Alaska, where aviation is the primary mode of transportation. It has been said that people in Alaska fly private
aircraft like those in the lower 48 take taxis. As can be


1984) and aid in the identification of target populations
for the dissemination of safety information.
However, when the leading cause of accidents, human
error, has been addressed, it is often only to report the
percentage of accidents associated with aircrew error in
general or to identify those in which alcohol or drug use
occurred. What is needed is a thorough human error
analysis. Previous attempts to do just that have been
met with limited success (O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, &
Morrison, 1994; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). This is
primarily because human error is influenced by a variety
of factors that are usually not addressed by traditional
classification schemes (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997).
Yet, with the development of the Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System (HFACS) previously unknown
patterns of human error in aviation accidents have been
uncovered (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2001a).

is, the individuals knew that what they were doing was
unauthorized but elected to continue anyway.
While there are many ways to distinguish between
types of violations, two distinct forms have been
identified, based on their etiology. The first, routine
violations, tend to be habitual by nature and are often
tolerated by the governing authority. The second type,
exceptional violations, appear as isolated departures
from authority and are not necessarily characteristic
of an individual’s behavior nor are they condoned by
management.

PURPOSE
The present study set out to uncover the types of human error, as identified by HFACS, that contributed to
GA accidents in Alaska and compare those results with
the rest of the United States. Both the human error findings and contextual factors are presented here to obtain
a more complete picture.

HFACS

METHODS

Drawing upon Reason’s “Swiss-cheese” model of human error, Wiegmann and Shappell developed HFACS.
The HFACS framework includes 19 causal categories
within Reason’s (1990) four levels of human failure, of
which the Unsafe Acts of Operators are most germane
to this study (Figure 2). For a complete description of
the HFACS framework, see Wiegmann and Shappell,
2003.
In general, the unsafe acts of operators (in the case
of aviation, the aircrew) can be classified as either errors
or violations. Within HFACS, the category of errors
was expanded to include three basic types (decision,
skill-based, and perceptual errors) that, in simple terms,
refer to errors of “thinking,” “doing,” and “perceiving.”
To be more specific, decision errors represent conscious
decisions/choices made by an individual that are carried
out as intended but prove to be inadequate for the situation at hand. In contrast, skill-based behavior within the
context of aviation is best described as “stick-and-rudder”
and other basic flight skills that occur without significant
conscious thought. As a result, these skill-based actions are
particularly vulnerable to failures of attention, memory,
or simply poor technique. Finally, perceptual errors occur
when sensory input is degraded or “unusual,” as is often
the case when flying at night, in weather, or in other
visually impoverished conditions.
By definition, errors occur while aircrews are behaving within the rules and regulations implemented by an
organization. In contrast, violations represent the willful
disregard for the rules and regulations that govern safe
flight. The key word is “willful” in this definition. That

General aviation accident data from calendar years
1990-2002 were obtained from databases maintained by
the National Transportation Safety Board and the FAA’s
National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center (NASDAC). In total, 24,978 GA accidents were extracted for
analysis. These so-called “GA” accidents actually included
a variety of aircraft being flown under several different
operating rules: 1) 14 CFR Part 91 – Civil aircraft other
than moored balloons, kites, unmanned rockets, and
unmanned free balloons; 2) 14 CFR Part 91F – Large
and turbine-powered multiengine airplanes; 3) 14 CFR
Part 103 – Ultralight vehicles; 4) 14 CFR Part 125 – Airplanes with seating capacity of 20 or more passengers or a
maximum payload capacity of 6,000 pounds or more; 5)
14 CFR Part 133 – Rotorcraft external-load operations;
6) 14 CFR Part 137 – Agricultural aircraft operations.
In addition, the database contained several accidents
involving public use aircraft (i.e., law enforcement, state
owned aircraft, etc.) and a few midair accidents involving
military aircraft.
It is difficult to envision that large commercial aircraft
being ferried from one airport to the next (operating
under 14 CFR Part 91F) or aircraft being used to spread
chemicals on a field (operating under 14 CFR Part 137)
can be equated with small private aircraft being flown
for personal or recreational purposes (operating under
14 CFR Part 91). Therefore, we selected only 14 CFR
Part 91 accidents for our analyses (22,987) to obtain a
more discrete GA sample.
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RESULTS

This analysis was primarily concerned with powered
aircraft and thus the data were further restricted to include
only accidents involving powered fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and gyrocopters. The remaining 22,248 accidents
were then examined for aircrew-related causal factors.
Since we were only interested in those accidents involving
aircrew error, not those that were purely mechanical in
nature or solely attributable to other human involvement,
a final reduction of the data was conducted. Note, this
does not mean that mechanical failures or other sources
of human error did not exist in the final database, only
that some form of aircrew error was also involved in each
of the accidents included. Figure 3 depicts the frequency
of GA accidents associated with human error from 1990
to 2002. In the end, 17,808 accidents were included in
the database that were associated with some form of human error and were submitted to further analyses using
the HFACS framework.

When using HFACS to examine the GA accident
data, the majority of the accidents are coded with either
a precondition for unsafe acts or an unsafe act. This is
due primarily to the fact that there is less of an organizational or supervisory influence on the majority of GA
pilots, as compared with their counterparts conducting
commercial or “for hire” operations.
Indeed, with few exceptions (e.g., flight instructors
and flight training institutions), the top two tiers of
HFACS (unsafe supervision and organizational influences) remained sparsely populated when examining
the GA accidents, leaving the majority of causal factors
within the bottom two tiers of HFACS. Consequently,
the balance of this report will focus only on the unsafe
acts of the operator level of the HFACS framework.
Unsafe Acts of Operators (Aircrew)
An overall review of the GA accident data yielded
the following results (see Figure 4). The most prevalent
error noted in the accident data over the past decade
was skill-based errors (73%), followed by decision errors
(28%), violations (13%), and perceptual errors (7%).
The relatively flat lines in the types of unsafe acts across
the years suggest that past intervention strategies have
had little differential impact on any particular category
of error.
To obtain a better sense of how human error differences
between Alaska and the rest of the United States (RoUS)
are represented in the data, the error types were broken
out accordingly (Figure 5). The analysis of the unsafe
acts revealed that there were slightly more decision errors,
fewer skill-based errors, perceptual errors, and violations
in Alaska than there were in the RoUS.
Note, the following analyses did not distinguish between those pilots who were native to Alaska and were
involved in an accident versus those who were less familiar
with the state. Accordingly, the statistics for Alaska reflect
the accidents that occurred within the physical boundaries of the state.
Skill-Based Errors. Differences that existed between
Alaska and the RoUS were fairly consistent across the
years of study, with slightly more skill-based errors associated with accidents in the RoUS (see Figure 6). The
only exception involved 1991, 1996, and again in 2002,
where the percentages were nearly equal.
Differences between Alaska and the RoUS were more
distinct when the actual types of skill-based error were
compared (Table 1). For instance, directional control
was the most frequently cited skill-based error for both
Alaska (19%) and for the rest of the U.S. (13%). Pilots in

Causal Factor Classification Using HFACS
Six GA pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma City
area as subject matter experts and received roughly 16
hours of training on the HFACS framework. All seven
were certified flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000
flight hours in GA aircraft (mean = 3,530 flight hours)
when the study began.
After training, the six GA pilot-raters were randomly
assigned accidents, so at least two separate pilot-raters
analyzed each accident independently. Using narrative
and tabular data obtained from both the NTSB and the
FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters classified each human
causal factor using the HFACS framework. Note, however,
that only those causal factors identified by the NTSB
were classified. That is, the pilot-raters were instructed
not to introduce additional casual factors that were not
identified by the original investigation. To do so would
be presumptuous and only infuse additional opinion,
conjecture, and guesswork into the analysis process.
After the pilot-raters made their initial classifications
of the NTSB causal factors using HFACS (i.e., skill-based
error, decision-error, etc.) the two ratings were compared.
Where differences existed between the ratings, the two
pilots were asked to reconcile their differences and an
agreed-upon “consensus” classification was included in
the database for further analysis. Overall, the independent
pilot-raters agreed on the classification of human causal
factors within the HFACS framework more than 85%
of the time. More important, all human causal factors
identified in the NTSB records were accommodated
using the HFACS framework, and the data were ultimately submitted to a final quality assurance analysis
by the authors.
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Figure 5. Percentage of accidents associated
with each of the unsafe acts of the operator.

Table 1. Top 5 Skill-based errors occurring for
Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
Alaska

Year

N (%)

RoUS

N (%)

Directional
Control

206 (18.6%)

Directional
Control

2139 (12.6%)

Compensation
for Wind
Conditions

170 (15.4%)

Airspeed

1932 (11.3%)

Stall

88 (8.0%)

Stall

1312 (7.7%)

Airspeed

76 (6.9%)

Aircraft
Control

1310 (7.7%)

Ground
Loop/Swerve

50 (4.5%)

Compensation
for Wind
Conditions

1009 (5.9%)



Alaska were more likely to experience a loss of directional
control of their aircraft than those in the rest of the U.S.
(odds ratio = 1.593, Χ2 = 33.400, p <.001). Additionally, inadequate compensation for wind conditions was
almost three times more likely to occur in Alaska (odds
ratio = 2.884, Χ2 = 150.893, p <.001). Conversely, pilots
in the rest of the U.S. were almost two times more likely
to commit airspeed errors than those in Alaska (odds ratio
= 1.733, Χ2 = 20.652, p <.001).
Decision Errors. To better understand the complexity
of the decision errors that were occurring in the accidents
for both Alaska and the rest of the U.S., a fine-grained
analysis of the data was conducted. Figure 7 illustrates
the decision error trends for Alaska and the rest of the
U.S. across the 13-year period from 1990-2002. With
the exception of 1990, 1991, and 2002, any difference
that did exist was remarkably consistent across years of
the study.

Percentage of Accidents

100

Upon closer examination, the largest proportion of
decision errors in the rest of the U.S. involved in-flight
planning/decision making, accounting for 19% of those
observed. However, the top decision error for pilots flying in Alaska dealt with decisions to utilize unimproved
landing, takeoff, taxi areas, or unsuitable terrain. As a
matter of fact, those flying in Alaska were almost 15
times more likely to take off from and land on unsuitable
terrain than those in the rest of the U.S. (odds ratio =
14.703, Χ2 = 829.461, p <.001). A break-out of the top
five decision errors for Alaska and the rest of the U.S. are
presented in Table 2.
Perceptual Errors. Generally associated with less than
10% of the accidents, perceptual errors in Alaska occurred
with a similar frequency as those in the rest of the U.S.
(see Figure 8). Moreover, there were few, if any, reliable
differences between Alaska and the RoUS when the type
of perceptual error was examined (Table 3). Indeed, given
the very small cell size for specific types of perceptual
errors occurring in Alaska, it was difficult to draw any
defensible conclusions.
Violations. In general, violations were associated with
less than 20% of GA accidents (Figure 9). For the entire
U.S. population, nearly 50% of these accidents resulted
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Table 4. Top 5 Violations occurring for Alaska and
the rest of the U.S.

Alaska
Rest of US

Alaska

N (%)

RoUS

N (%)

38 (32.5%)

VFR Into IMC

369 (15.5%)

Aircraft Weight
& Balance

13 (11.1%)

Operation with
Known
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261 (10.9%)
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12 (10.3%)
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Figure 9. Violations broken out by Alaska
versus the rest of the U.S.
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Figure 11. Percentage of fatal versus non-fatal
accidents in Alaska and the rest of the U.S.

in a fatality. When examining accidents in Alaska separately from the rest of the U.S., differences were found.
Accidents involving violations in Alaska were nine times
more likely to result in a fatality (odds ratio = 9.248, Χ2
= 127.606, p <.001); whereas those that occurred in the
rest of the U.S. were four times more likely to result in a
fatality, (odds ratio = 4.410, Χ2 = 1054.059, p <.001).
A closer look at the types of violations revealed that
the most frequently cited violation for all GA accidents
was Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC), (Table 4). VFR flight
into IMC, alone, accounted for one-third of the violations in the Alaska data and was more than two and a
half times more likely to occur than in the rest of the U.S.
(odds ratio = 2.629, Χ2 = 22.467, p <.001). Furthermore,
when the weather-related violations were combined (VFR
into IMC, flight into known adverse weather, and flight
into adverse weather), nearly half of the violations in the
Alaska data were represented.

Contextual Data
Phase of Flight. The majority of GA accidents for Alaska
and the rest of the U.S. occurred during the landing and
takeoff phases of flight (see Figure 10). Note, however,
that the accidents in Alaska had a higher occurrence in
both of those phases than those in the rest of the U.S.,
where cruise and approach were higher. Additionally, when
takeoff and climb are compared against descent, approach,
and landing, across the board, comparatively more accidents occurred during the latter phases of flight.
Fatal vs. Non-Fatal and Injury Level. Curiously, accidents occurring in the RoUS were more likely to include
a fatality (23%) than those in Alaska (10%, see Figure
11). Specifically, the accidents in the RoUS were 2.8 times
more likely to result in a fatality (odds ratio =2.808, Χ2
= 125.090, p <.001). This pattern held across all levels
of injury severity (Figure 12) as roughly three-fourths
of the GA accidents occurring in Alaska involved no
injuries at all.
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Weather and Lighting Conditions. Very few differences
between Alaska and the rest of the U.S. were noted with
regard to either lighting conditions (day, twilight, and
night) or weather (IMC vs. VMC). That is, the vast
majority of accidents occurred during the daytime and
in VMC conditions (Figures 13 & 14). However, when
the two conditions were combined to create a measure
of visibility (i.e., clear versus impoverished condition),
some small but significant differences emerged (Figure
15). Specifically, accidents were more likely to occur in
visually impoverished (at night/twilight or IMC) conditions in the rest of the U.S. than in Alaska (odds ratio
=2.160, Χ2 = 68.766, p <.001).

Upon closer examination, both Alaska and the rest
of the U.S. exhibited similar problems with regards to
the specific types of each HFACS causal category. When
addressing skill-based errors, the accident data suggest
that aircraft handling should be taken into account when
determining where interventions should be applied. For
instance, any training (both ab initio and recurrent)
along these lines should include control of the aircraft
on the ground (e.g., ground loops), crosswind landings,
avoiding and recovering from stalls, and general control
of the aircraft in flight. Given the inherent risk associated
with some of these maneuvers, it makes sense to utilize
modern simulators during this training. Unfortunately, it
is unclear whether adequate transfer of training warrants
this possibility. Therefore, before utilizing simulations to
address these issues, research needs to be conducted to
examine the role simulators might offer. In the meantime
however, it appears to make sense to emphasize these
topics during actual in-flight training.
The only notable exception among the HFACS casual
categories involved decision errors. Specifically, pilots in
Alaska were more likely to utilize unsuitable terrain for
landing, taxi, and takeoff. It would appear that educating aviators on the hazards of utilizing frozen rivers or
gravel bars, for example, may reduce these types of errors.
However, it may be that there are simply more “improved”

Discussion
On the surface, there were no major differences between
Alaska and the rest of the U.S. with regard to the overall
pattern of human error. If anything, there were slightly
more decision errors associated with accidents occurring
in Alaska and fewer skill-based errors, perceptual errors,
and violations. This information is similar to research in
other aviation operations, which identified skill-based
errors as the most commonly occurring type of error
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003; Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001b; 2003).


areas in the rest of the United States, providing pilots
with more options in case of an emergency (i.e., alternate
airports, highways, roads, etc.), in which case education
in and of itself may not prove successful. Additionally,
it is worth noting that “unsuitable terrain” was defined
by the NTSB investigators after the fact; the moment to
moment judgment of how suitable terrain may be during
a flight may be influenced by factors not considered fully
in post hoc analyses.
Also of concern in both Alaska and the rest of the
U.S. was in-flight planning/decision making. After all,
decisions made during flight are often more critical than
those occurring on the ground. Thus, when confronted
with important decisions in-flight, pilots are often under
pressure to be right the first time with limited information. Scenario-based training along these lines as
provided within the FAA-Industry Training Standards
(FITS) program may improve decision-making in the
cockpit, particularly if examples are drawn from the
accident record.
Of the unsafe acts that aircrew commit, addressing
violations may be the most difficult and complex. Recall
that violations are the “willful” disregard for the rules
and, as such, are not necessarily something that can be
easily deterred or mitigated. Nevertheless, since nearly
half of violations involved fatalities, such behaviors as
VFR flight into IMC are of great concern to the FAA
and other aviation safety professionals.
Even though the percentage of accidents associated
with violations did not differ markedly between Alaska
and the rest of the U.S., the specific types of violations did
differ in meaningful ways. In particular, when intentional
VFR flight into IMC and other adverse weather conditions were combined, an alarming 47% of the violations
occurring in Alaska were accounted for (27% for the rest
of the U.S.). Exactly why a larger proportion was observed
in Alaska remains unknown, but one reason may be the
rapid climatic changes that often occur, especially around
mountainous areas.
So why would a VFR-only pilot fly into such hazardous conditions? This has perplexed safety professionals
and aviation psychologists alike. At least one study suggests that pilots' overconfidence in their personal ability
and need for goal achievement (too much was already
invested in the trip to turn around or deviate from course)
may explain this behavior (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002).
Other research proposed certain factors that influence
the pilot’s decision to press into the weather, specifically
in Alaska, could be due to the lack of relevant information, ambiguous cues, time pressure, and risk perception,
among others (Holbrook, Orasanu, & McCoy, 2003).
Batt and O’Hare (2005) have proposed that the decision
to fly into degraded conditions could depend on the stage

of flight. They hypothesize that in the early part of the
flight, pilots will weigh the alternatives of continuing the
flight or turning around. Later in flight, pilots debate on
whether to perform a precautionary landing (considering the loss and potential damage that can result) or to
continue into weather and hope conditions improve,
avoiding the potential loss. Regardless of the reasons,
it is imperative that pilots be adequately informed and
trained on the real dangers that they encounter when
they continue or attempt VFR flight into hazardous
weather conditions.
Current interventions, like weather cameras in mountain passes and other locations, have proved useful by
providing pilots with access to real-time weather information and therefore allowing them to make informed
decisions. In addition, the Medallion Foundation has
provided GA pilots training using high-resolution flight
simulators capable of producing simulated weather and
lighting conditions over the Alaskan terrain. With this
technology, pilots are able to safely navigate through
Alaska and see what flying through places such as Merrill
Pass in adverse weather conditions could entail, a difficult
task even for a highly experienced pilot to successfully
perform in clear conditions.
Alaska, as perhaps the FAA’s largest aviation laboratory,
has been the testbed for advanced avionics like those associated with the Capstone project. Enhanced weather
radar, global positioning sensors, Automated Dependent
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), and other cutting-edge
technologies provide a more accurate picture of how the
weather, terrain, and traffic situations actually look from
inside the cockpit. These technologies have proven useful
with 14 CFR Part 135 (commuter) operations (Williams,
Yost, Holland, & Tyler, 2002). However, their efficacy
within GA remains to be seen.
Although technology has led to a reduction in aviation
accidents in Alaska, we cannot rely solely on it as the
panacea for GA safety. Being a successful pilot requires
basic “stick and rudder” skills. These are particularly
important during the critical phases of flight (i.e., takeoff
and landing). Similar to previous reports (AOPA, 2005),
we found the largest percentage of accidents occurred
during takeoff and landing. A larger proportion of these
accidents occurred in Alaska than in the rest of the U.S.
This is consistent with the observation that in Alaska decisions concerning takeoff and landing from unimproved
terrain account for a significant proportion of accidents.
Importantly, unlike violations, these types of decision
errors typically have not resulted in fatalities (Wiegmann
et al., 2005). However, this does not mean that they did
not involve significant damage to the aircraft or have a
significant economic impact.
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